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US Merger Review: A ‘Goldilocksian’
Perspective
William Kolasky

Abstract

US merger control rests on four strong cornerstones. The first is section 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950, which created the
substantial lessening of competition standard as the test for the legality of mergers
and acquisitions. The second is the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in Philadelphia National Bank, which relied on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
from industrial organisation economics to fashion a presumption that mergers that
significantly increase concentration in already concentrated industries will lessen
competition, imposing on the parties the burden of rebutting the government’s
structural case. The third is the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, which introduced the concept of pre-merger notification, to give the agencies an opportunity to review major transactions before they are consummated.
The fourth, and final, cornerstone was the publication by the Justice Department
in 1982 of a completely new set of Merger Guidelines, which have been refined
over time and which set forth the basic analytical framework the agencies use to
evaluate mergers.
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US merger control rests on four strong cornerstones. The first is section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver
Act in 1950, which created the substantial
lessening of competition standard as the test
for the legality of mergers and acquisitions.
The second is the Supreme Court’s 1962
decision in Philadelphia National Bank,
which relied on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm from industrial organisation economics to fashion a presumption
that mergers that significantly increase concentration in already concentrated industries will lessen competition, imposing on
the parties the burden of rebutting the government’s structural case. The third is the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, which introduced the concept
of pre-merger notification, to give the agencies an opportunity to review major transactions before they are consummated. The
fourth, and final, cornerstone was the publication by the Justice Department in 1982
of a completely new set of Merger Guidelines, which have been refined over time
and which set forth the basic analytical
framework the agencies use to evaluate
mergers.
As we approach the 30th anniversary of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, now is a good time to evaluate
how well the US’s current merger control
regime is working. As my title suggests, I
take the position is that our current system,
developed over more than a half century of
trial and error, actually works quite well.
As Goldilocks might put it, the agencies
finally have it “just about right”. This view
seemed to be shared by most practitioners
who participated in a three-day workshop
on merger enforcement sponsored by the
Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in February 2004. The
participating practitioners expressed general satisfaction with the analytical framework set forth in the Merger Guidelines and

with its application. Even those who are
critical of antitrust enforcement generally
seem to view merger control as a success.
For example, in an article in the American
Enterprise Institute’s Regulation magazine,
George Bittlingmayer credits the 1982
guidelines and the HSR merger review
process with being responsible for “a more
efficient corporate sector and quite plausibly for an expanding, dynamic economy
and a booming stock market” (25 Regulation 46, October 2002).
Inevitably, not everyone will agree with
this Goldilocksean view. The agencies continue to be criticised by some for being too
lax in permitting mergers and by others for
being too restrictive. One example of the
latter view is a study by two economists at
the Brookings Institution, Robert Crandall
and Clifford Winston, published in the
Journal of Economic Perspectives (17 J
Econ Perspectives 3, autumn 2003). Crandall and Winston attempted to look at the
effect of merger enforcement activity on
price-cost margins from 1984 to 1996 in 30
two-digit manufacturing industries. They
found that successful merger challenges had
a negative effect on those margins, but that
the effect was not statistically significant,
whereas unsuccessful merger challenges
were associated with a decline in margins
that was statistically significant and consent
decrees were associated with a statistically
significant increase in margins. From this,
Crandall and Winston concluded that
merger enforcement activity has not
increased consumer welfare in any systematic way and may even have reduced it.
Gregory Werden, a senior economist at the
Justice Department, has written an effective
critique of the Crandall-Winston study
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, Publication No. 04-09). Werden
shows that the data on which Crandall and
Winston relied are too highly aggregated to
be useful for evaluating the performance of
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markets in which mergers occurred. For
more than two-thirds of the mergers that
were challenged, the volume of commerce
in the relevant markets as defined in the
government’s complaint accounted for less
than one per cent of the total volume of
commerce in the two-digit industries Crandall and Winston examined. Those mergers, therefore, could not conceivably have
had any significant effect on the overall performance of those industries.
Another way to measure the performance of the agencies in reviewing mergers
is to look at whether they have been consistent over time. Using this measure, the
agencies score quite well. A study undertaken by FTC commissioner Thomas Leary
in 2001 examined the rate of merger challenges over a 20-year period, from 1981 to
2000 (70 Antitrust L J 105, winter 2002).
He found that over the entire 20-year
period, with the exception of a brief period
during the second Reagan administration,
merger challenges as a percentage of total
merger filings have fluctuated within a very
narrow range—between 1.4 and 3.0 per
cent, with no significant variations from
administration to administration. The FTC
Bureau of Economics has just published a
more rigorous statistical study, examining
merger enforcement at the FTC during the
period from 1996 to 2003 (Malcolm B
Coate and Shawn W Ulrick, ‘Transparency
at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal
Merger
Review
Process
1996–2003’, FTC Working Paper, February
2005). That study found that five key variables could explain most enforcement decisions—industry, concentration, entry,
customer complaints, and ‘hot documents’.
It found no statistically significant difference in the merger enforcement decisions of
the Pitofsky and Muris commissions.
The FTC Bureau of Economics data
also provide interesting insights into when
a merger is likely to be challenged. They
show that, with the exception of the petroleum and banking sectors, there were no
challenges in markets where the post-acquisition HHI was below 1800 and the
increase was less than 500. They also show
that, with the exception of the petroleum,
chemical, pharmaceutical, and grocery
industries, transactions which reduce the
number of significant competitors from
four to three seem to be the tipping point
for enforcement action (see William J Baer
et al, ‘Taking Stock: Recent Trends in US
Merger Enforcement’, 18 Antitrust 15,
spring 2004). According to FTC data, such
transactions are as likely to be challenged
as not. Mergers that leave four or more significant competitors are less likely than not
to be challenged, and mergers that leave
WWW.GLOBALCOMPETITIONREVIEW.COM
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only one or two competitors are more likely
than not to be challenged. (The tipping
point for petroleum, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and groceries appears to be fiveto-four.) The FTC study also shows that of
the other significant factors (ease of entry,
customer complaints, and ‘hot documents’),
customer complaints are the most important; strong, credible customer complaints
appear to be the single most decisive factor
in predicting enforcement action in highly
concentrated markets.
Critics of the agencies’ enforcement
decisions sometimes point to the agencies’
relatively poor track record in winning litigated merger challenges in court as evidence that the agencies are too aggressive
in challenging mergers. During the eight
years of the Clinton administration, the

agencies prevailed in half of the merger
cases they litigated to a decision (eight of
16). In the first four years of the Bush
administration, the agencies won only two
of six merger challenges litigated to a decision. These statistics, however, may simply
reflect that the only cases parties are willing to invest the time and money to litigate
are those in which they feel they have a substantial prospect of winning. (It is worth
noting in this regard that the parties abandoned several other mergers in the first four
years of the Bush administration after the
agencies initiated litigation.)
What all of these statistics obscure is
that the agencies have become much more
sophisticated over the last three decades in
evaluating the likely competitive effects of
proposed mergers. The final piece of the
puzzle was fully integrating efficiencies into
the competitive effects analysis. The agencies also now make more effective use of
quantitative data and advanced econometric tools in defining markets and evaluating
likely competitive effects.
Even if the agencies do a good job in
determining which mergers to challenge,
the merger review process might still be
criticised if it imposes undue costs on companies in securing merger clearance. There
is no question that a full-blown second
request investigation can be extremely burdensome. With the advent of electronic discovery, full compliance with a second
request can often require five or six months
of work and cost the parties several million
dollars each. These costs put a premium on
the agencies finding ways to identify which
transactions raise real competitive concerns
during the initial 30-day waiting period
without the need for a second request, as
well to narrow the second request as much
as possible while still giving the agency the
information it needs to reach a wellinformed decision.
Both the anecdotal evidence and the
data suggest that the agencies deserve high
marks for making effective use of the initial
waiting period. The data show that the
agencies are becoming much better at winnowing out transactions that do not raise
serious competitive issues during the first
30 days. A recent article by William Baer
and two co-authors compared the performance of the Clinton administration in this
regard during the period from 1994 to
2000 with the performance of the Bush
administration in 2002–2003 (18 Antitrust
15, spring 2004). The article reports that,
during the Clinton administration, 28.8 per
cent of all transactions in which the agencies opened a preliminary investigation
received second requests, whereas during
2002–2003 the number dropped to 19.1
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per cent, a nearly one-third improvement.
Part of the reason for the agencies’
improved performance in this area is that
lawyers who practise regularly before the
agencies understand the importance of
avoiding a second request, and have therefore found ways to ‘front-load’ the review
process. Most importantly, these lawyers
understand that it is critical to give the
agencies, on a voluntary basis, the information they need to reach an informed
decision during the initial 30 days. In addition, these lawyers increasingly advise the
agencies informally of a proposed transaction in advance of filing the formal notification, giving the agency additional time to
review the transaction before it must decide
whether to issue a second request.
Because of the importance of the initial
30-day waiting period, there is one nagging
problem that still needs to be addressed,
and that is the recurring problem of clearance disputes between the two agencies.
According to an FTC press release, between
1 October 1999 and February 2002, 24 per
cent of all clearance requests were delayed
because of clearance issues, with an average delay of 15 days. To their credit, the
agencies attempted to remedy this problem
in early 2002 by agreeing to a new protocol for resolving clearance issues. During
the brief period that the new system was in
place, the average time for clearance
dropped to 1.5 days. Regrettably, Senator
Ernest Hollings forced the agencies to abandon their agreement because he felt the
agreement gave the Justice Department too
much authority over media and telecommunications mergers. Although there are no
more recent statistics, anecdotal evidence
suggests that since the agreement was abandoned the former problems have returned
and are becoming increasingly serious.
Now that Senator Hollings has retired, the
agencies should make another effort to fix
the clearance process.
With respect to the burden imposed by
second requests, the agencies do seem to be
making some progress. Both agencies have
undertaken merger process reform initiatives designed to reduce the burden and to
encourage more cooperation between the
parties and the staff in negotiating the scope
of the second request. Among these reforms
is a more effective internal appeals mechanism. Partly because of these reforms, the
staffs of the two agencies now seem more
willing to prioritise the second request in
order to allow the parties to give the agencies the information they need to reach a
decision without full compliance. Lest
Goldilocks become Dr Pangloss, it is important to emphasise that still more needs to
be done to reduce the cost and burden of
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second requests, but progress is clearly
being made.
A final area that warrants mention and
to which the agencies have also been devoting increased attention is the subject of
merger remedies. Notwithstanding this
attention, there continues to be some
important differences between the two
agencies. One of the most important is with
respect to upfront buyers. In 2002 and
2003, 41 per cent of FTC consent orders
required an upfront buyer, whereas none of
the Justice Department’s divestiture consent
decrees did (Baer, 18 Antitrust 15). The new
chair of the FTC has argued that the differences between the two agencies in this
regard have more to do with differences in
the industries for which they are responsible than with any underlying policy differ-

ence (see remarks of Deborah Platt Majoras, 18 November 2004, at 7–11, available
at www.ftc.gov). It is not clear, however,
why upfront buyers should be needed for
divestitures of supermarkets or retail gasoline stations but not for dairies or radio stations. That being the case, some further
convergence between the two agencies in
this area would seem desirable.
Overall, then, both the Justice Department and the FTC deserve high, but not
perfect, scores for their performance in the
area of merger control. There is also good
reason to share George Bittlingmayer’s view
that the agencies’ strong performance in
this area has contributed positively to the
performance of the American economy. As
both agencies and most economists recognise, while mergers may be a means to
acquire market power, they also serve
important, pro-competitive functions.
Mergers not only facilitate transfer of intangible capital across firms, but also provide
a means of replacing or disciplining inefficient managers. Mergers also facilitate exit,
thereby encouraging entry and investment.
Horizontal mergers are particularly valuable, both because they are the ones most
likely to generate efficiencies and because
companies in the same industry are in the
best position to identify and run other, less
well-managed companies.
While some recent studies have questioned the value of mergers in terms of economic performance, it is important not to
over-generalise from these studies. One frequently-cited study by KPMG found that 70
per cent of mergers “failed”, in the sense
that they did not increase shareholder value
for the acquiring company (Boston Globe,
6 February 2005, at C1). Another wellknown study by three Ohio state economists
found that, from 1991 to 2001, acquiring
shareholders lost $216 billion in the three
days following American merger announcements (The Economist, 5 February 2005, at
58). These losses, however, were concentrated in just 87 big deals in the preiod
1998–2001. A broader study of all mergers
in America from 1962 to 2001 found that
mergers created, on average, combined
gains to shareholders of 7.3 per cent (The
Economist, 21 February 2004, at 62).
Another study by Bain & Co. found that
companies most successful at creating longterm shareholder value tend to be frequent,
steady acquirers; frequent acquirers outperformed occasional buyers by a factor of 1.7
and non-buyers by a factor of almost two to
one (Strategy & Leadership, 9 August
2004, at 518). Overall, therefore, mergers
remain an important source of dynamic efficiencies, and merger control ought not to
impose an unnecessary tax on them. ■
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